The big thing is it is a half-measure against an emerging threat model.
Don't get me wrong, we need bootloader protection like this. However the approach that is being taken is wrong. This is the UAC of boot loader protections.... A half-assed measure that if Microsoft actually looked at what everyone else was doing they would have supported something different.
Consider the following scenario:
Spear-phishing attach aimed at the right individual compromises their computer through an IE exploit (never happens, right?) and steals the bootloader private key.
What's the response? If the key cannot be changed then overnight this fancy new protection has been rendered no protection at all. The key can then be sold for top dollar to malware programmers. The solution for the user will be to wait a few months and then buy a new computer.....
So you are right that the sort of implementation we are talking about will not make much of a difference long-term, but for a different reason: it offers no long-term security if the key cannot be rotated.
I don't doubt that something could be designed right, but I do doubt that such a design in security-critical aspects of computing will arise with Microsoft's cooperation.
Don't get me wrong, we need bootloader protection like this. However the approach that is being taken is wrong. This is the UAC of boot loader protections.... A half-assed measure that if Microsoft actually looked at what everyone else was doing they would have supported something different.
Consider the following scenario:
Spear-phishing attach aimed at the right individual compromises their computer through an IE exploit (never happens, right?) and steals the bootloader private key.
What's the response? If the key cannot be changed then overnight this fancy new protection has been rendered no protection at all. The key can then be sold for top dollar to malware programmers. The solution for the user will be to wait a few months and then buy a new computer.....
So you are right that the sort of implementation we are talking about will not make much of a difference long-term, but for a different reason: it offers no long-term security if the key cannot be rotated.
I don't doubt that something could be designed right, but I do doubt that such a design in security-critical aspects of computing will arise with Microsoft's cooperation.